



I'm enormously honored to be here with such an impressive group of
women interested in the complex question of Women, Justice, and Authority.
Thanks to Judith Resnik and Mary Clark and the students working with them
for all their hard work in putting this outstanding weekend together.
The five of us are charged with the unenviable task of "Imagining Justice,"
a task not significantly less daunting than, say, imagining truth, humor, or
community. In preparation for this afternoon, I've been in my office or in the
subway trying to imagine justice and after some time, was horrified when I
discovered that I was doing it wrong. Our charge was even worse than I had
thought: We had to imagine justice as women. What could that possibly mean?
What posture was I directed to assume in such a project? Given that we were
the first panel of the conference, I felt a particular responsibility to at least get
the question right.
I say all this not to cleverly resist the question, but rather to frame my
comments within the problematics of what it means to consider justice as
women and justice for women. Is there such a thing as women's justice,
different from an unmarked generic justice? Or worse, different from men's
justice? In the end, I have taken this to be a question that demands an
epistemic stance: How do I formulate questions of justice given my
commitments to critical race feminism?
Assuming this posture at the threshold of a third wave of feminism, I
would like to explore two principle issues. The first relates to struggles from
the past and the lessons they provide us today about the proper role of rights in
struggles for gendered and racial justice. I will draw particularly from the
experiences of newly freed African Americans in the 19th Century. Their
history teaches us that the granting or winning of rights cannot be the ultimate
goal of any theory of justice because the conferral of rights merely inaugurates
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a new regulatory relationship with the State, which provides us with a new
place from which to battle structural hierarchy and subordination.
The second issue I wish to discuss is more of a challenge than a lesson, but
it derives from the evolution of feminist theory, particularly feminist legal
theory, over the last twenty years. My challenge to you is this: Heterosexual
feminists need to revisit and reinvigorate a feminist politics of the erotic in
which the female body is figured not only as a site of danger and a vector of
reproductive responsibility, but restored as a source of pleasure, desire and
intimacy. At the risk of leaving the mistaken impression that I have joined
forces with post-feminists Katie Roiphe, Naomi Wolf, or Camille Paglia-
which I most certainly have not-let me share some thoughts with you about
the usefulness of rights strategies before I elaborate further on how grim
heterosexuality seems to have become for feminist legal theorists.
II. FIRST, SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT RIGHTS
A robust theory of rights inevitably figures in any modem conception of
citizenship and equality. This is certainly the case for theories of justice and
authority for women. Whether it's the Equal Rights Amendment, suspect class
status or statutory protections against sex discrimination, inevitably we are
pulled in the direction of a rights-based formulation of what it means to achieve
justice for women. In order to gain a better grip on just what a "rights-
centered" approach to justice can get you, I recently spent quite a bit of time in
archives in Mississippi and North Carolina, trying to understand what the
granting of rights meant to newly emancipated African American people in the
Reconstruction era. Their experiences provide important lessons for us today
in framing questions of justice in rights-based terms.
As most of you well know, enslaved people were considered morally and
legally unfit to marry. Notwithstanding this legal infirmity, many enslaved
people lived as husband and wife and enacted their own marriage rituals such
as jumping over broomsticks, and reciting vows such as "until death or distance
do you part." Upon emancipation, the ability to marry was widely regarded as
one of the most fundamental rights attendant to liberty. Newly freed people by
the thousands went about legitimizing their previously unrecognized marriages.
On the heels of the abolition of slavery most Southern states enacted laws that
automatically married freed men and women who had been living together as
husband and wife. These laws were laudable for the degree to which the law
granted retroactive legal recognition of the integrity of enslaved peoples'
marriages. Their self-executing nature relieved the freed people of the
obligation to buy a marriage license, which often ran more than five dollars and
was a prohibitive expense for most people.
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The alacrity with which freed men and women exercised the marriage right
was fueled in no small part by aggressive nudging from Freedmen's Bureau
agents-federal agents charged with the task of easing the transition from
enslavement to freedom for African American people. In the eyes of many
Freedmen's Bureau agents, marriage was "the great lever by which the freed
men and women are to be lifted up and prepared for a state of civilization," and
its obligations of monogamy and support would impose the necessary sexual
and moral restraint on a people believed to be quite primitive in their sexual
ways.
After emancipation, many freed men and women continued to organize
their intimate lives according to an array of acceptable arrangements. The
spectrum of intimate relationships enslaved people entered into prior to
emancipation were used as evidence of the widely held belief among white
people that freed men and women were morally depraved. In addition to more
traditionally monogamous long term unions, slave societies entertained an array
of acceptable adult relationships from sweethearting to taking up to trial
marriages. Some of these relationships included conceiving and raising
children and some did not. Many white people found one additional
complication to emancipation quite difficult to identify with: As families and
couples separated by slavery reunited at the close of the Civil War, many
African American people found themselves with more than one spouse. Over
the course of one's enslavement, one might be married several consecutive
times as husbands and wives were sold away, and thought never to be seen
again.
Once reunited, many freed women and men were untroubled by the
thought of having more than one spouse, lover, or provider for the children-
yet the Freedmen's Bureau thought differently and forced people to choose one
and only one spouse. If you refused to choose, they would do it for you, or you
were turned over to the local authorities for criminal prosecution.
Thus, this period of African Americans' inauguration into the realm of
marital rights was cause for celebration, confusion, and, for many, pain.
Freedmen's Bureau records, as well as the original criminal court records in
Mississippi and North Carolina, show that with the granting of the right to
marry came a rather aggressive campaign of criminal enforcement of bigamy,
adultery and unlawful cohabitation laws against African Americans who failed
to conform their intimate lives to the strict script that Victorian marriage laws
dictated. Mistakenly believing that freedom included the freedom to organize
their intimate lives as they wished, some freed men and women affirmatively
rejected the legal limitations imposed by marriage. Others were unaware that
they had been automatically married by law and that their new legal status
required them to use divorce laws to end those marital unions. Instead, they
2002
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
merely walked away from failed relationships and took up with someone
new-an action that left them vulnerable to adultery or bigamy prosecution.
In addition to the belief that robust compliance with marriage laws would
civilize the freedmen, state officials had other incentives to aggressively
enforce marriage laws against African Americans. First, with marriage came a
statutory duty to support dependents, whereby responsibility for the financial
support of indigent wives and children was shifted from the state to black men.
Second, in states like Mississippi, bigamy was a felony and upon conviction
one was automatically disenfranchised-a penalty felt acutely by newly
enfranchised African American men. Third, southern planters were badly in
need of an inexpensive labor force that could do the agricultural work that
enslaved people had previously done for free. A convict leasing system was
promptly put into place in the immediate post bellum period, such that planters
could lease prisoners very cheaply from the state to plant and pick cotton and
other crops. During this period, the aggressive criminal enforcement of
marriage and vagrancy laws against African American men served to populate
state prisons with black men who could be leased out to their former masters
under conditions usually worse than slavery.
There is much more I could say about the complexities of freed men and
women's "enjoyment" of the right to marry in the immediate post bellum
period. Suffice it to say for now that the granting of marriage rights for African
Americans was at best bittersweet. Many people, men in particular,
experienced their new status as rights holders as one that enabled a new
regulatory relationship with the state that was quite punitive in nature.
This history teaches us that rights-based strategies are not to be abandoned,
but must always be regarded as provisional. Their success cannot deliver the
demise of structural subordination, but instead provides us with a new place
from which to negotiate power, domination, and hierarchy with new tools.
III. SEX
My study of the experiences of African Americans in the immediate post
bellum period taught me something else as well. Both enslaved and newly
emancipated African American women were quite creative in organizing their
lives in such a way as to find pleasure, companionship and assistance in raising
children from various sources. An African American woman's lovers were not
necessarily the persons with whom she chose to live, and she may or may not
have chosen to raise her children with their biological father. The most
desirable lover was not always the best provider, and many women preferred
pooling of resources among various groupings of adults and children as the best
way to meet these complex needs. Thus, these women found sweethearting,
taking up, trial marriages, and non-monogamy to be preferable in many cases to
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conforming to Victorian expectations that all needs be satisfied in one family
form. For a short time, these women actively explored a different kind of
intimate and sexual citizenship than that which we imagine today.
Today we celebrate victories that were unimaginable to women in the 19th
century or even twenty years ago. Feminists can boast having achieved a kind
of hegemony over the terms of the debate regarding a set of social practices
identified as central to women's subordination. Sexual harassment in the
workplace is uniformly regarded as a form of sex-based discrimination, and the
deeply gendered nature of domestic violence is now so broadly accepted that
Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act. The cultural debate over
whether these practices are sex out of control or gender-based power seem to
have been won by the power side of the argument.
When feminists, particularly legal feminists, talk about sex and the female
body these days, the conversation inevitably arcs in one of two directions: sex
as danger-(domestic violence, sexual harassment, rape) or sex as reproduction
(leading to problems that arise from having and rearing children). I do not
want to deny the importance of these issues to women; rather I prefer to
highlight what they seem to have crowded out in recent years. Curiously, since
the end of the so-called "sex wars" in the 1980's, it seems that straight
feminists have ceded to queer theorists the job of imagining the body as a site
of pleasure, intimacy, and erotic possibility. Indeed, after sitting through so
many conferences in which the topic of hetero-sex is so quickly transposed to
one of injury, danger, and responsibility, I feel like I have encountered the most
persuasive argument in favor of a biological explanation for sexual orientation:
What straight woman would actually choose to be heterosexual if it weren't
hard wired?
In 1982, Gayle Rubin wondered whether feminism was best equipped to
analyze and address gender-based subordination, and mused that it may not be
an adequate or appropriate discourse to analyze sexuality. Yet, I do not think
we should give up on feminism so easily. I think it is time that feminists
reclaim the body as a site of erotic pleasure and intimacy and move these issues
back into the center of our theories of sexual citizenship. Martha Fineman has
done an outstanding job of decoupling relationships grounded in dependency
from those that have an erotic connection, provoking a radical rethinking of
motherhood. But too few of us, as feminists, have stepped in to retheorize the
erotic and other intimate adult relationships that end up as the residue of
Fineman's work.
Welfare reform, demands for childcare, restructuring of the relationship
between work and leisure, and reform of the institution of marriage, including
adultery and, yes, monogamy could all be opportunities for feminists to argue
for the fundamental importance of intimate and erotic attachments that defy the
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traditional dyad of spouse and child as the primary, if not exclusive, objects of
women's hedonic lives.
Intimacies across race, between women, or with men that may or may not
contain an erotic element, or be consciously experienced as such, hold out the
possibility of radical connections, trust, and transformation. We don't have
much of a feminist theory of any of this. It's time we did.
So for me, imagining a just society entails a rather radical reworking of
family, partnering, intimacy and the erotic than is currently structured by law
and social norms. The creativity in this regard that I saw in 19th century
African American communities is an inspiration to all of us to imagine justice
in our hedonic lives more expansively.
